Use policy
Introduction
As political factions in the United States clash over the prospect of a clean energy transition, it has become increasingly clear that reimagining the country's energy infrastructures for the 21 st century means choosing between competing national economic futures. In the U.S. context, worsening conflicts with embattled fossil fuel industries and regions dominate much of this discussion, with new populism around the demise of U.S. coal only the latest, most confusedand recently most significant, in the wake of the 2016 Presidential election. However, fossil fuel industries' rhetorical and institutional assaults on renewables, and clean energy supporters' own recent organizing successes against fossil fuels (Knuth 2017) , are far from the only face of this struggle. In this paper, I will engage a debate that I argue has profound significance for the future of clean energy in the United States, the nature of the green economy that energy development might produce, and the shape of U.S. power within 21 st century capitalism. In the late 2000s and early 2010s, U.S. clean energy advocates experienced a profoundly confusing phenomenon, one that is still reverberating through the industry: Silicon Valley led a would-be boom in "cleantech" innovation and manufacturing that lapsed into an embarrassing failure, one that still tarnishes the sector in the minds of many. Almost simultaneously, renewables recorded a wave of staggering successes: the country saw a surge of solar and wind energy deployment, and a radical cheapening of these technologies. Through this ongoing wave of infrastructure development, renewables have achieved cost-competitiveness with fossil electricity sources in an increasing number of markets across the country. This highly disparate experience has provoked contrasting -and competing -visions for the future of U.S. clean energy, and a clean energy economy.
On the one hand, as I will discuss in the first section of this paper, entrepreneurs and venture capitalists that had backed Silicon Valley's failed cleantech boom were profoundly frustrated in its wake. With new self-appointed spokespersons like Bill Gates, in the mid-2010s they set out in search for an explanation of what had gone so wrong -and how it might be remedied to advance the sector moving forward. They expressed a keen sense of opportunity lost for U.S. companies to develop "breakthrough" renewable energy technologies to transform the sector and the U.S. economy into the 21 st century. Moreover, as I will explore in the second section, they sought governmental protection against a competitor their past experience equipped them poorly to fight, as China rose to become a global clean energy manufacturing leader not on the strength of new research breakthroughs but on the mass production and deployment of longmature technologies -ones that the United States had played an important role in developing, but had chronically neglected in deployment.
On the other hand, as I will argue in the third section, a competing set of entrepreneurs and financiers saw in the U.S. wave of renewable energy infrastructure deployment in the 2010s -and the cheap imports that helped enable that boom -a major new opportunity. They maintain that the United States has not lost its chance for genuine clean energy breakthroughs, nor for the international comparative advantage and monopoly rents, private and public, these innovations might bring. Rather, U.S. public and private actors should reimagine (more accurately, continue
to reimagine) what "counts" as innovation, within cleantech and full stop. They have proposed ways by which Silicon Valley entrepreneurs might remake cleantech in information technology's 3 image, a "Cleantech 2.0". Crucially, within this broader rethinking they have framed financial innovation, and a rising "fintech" sector, as a legitimate and necessary source of breakthroughs in renewable energy deployment -arguments made before the late 2000s financial crisis for financial productivity, financial engineering, and U.S. financial hegemony returned in a green, high-tech form.
With this paper, I take up a debate that has become central to the politics of energy transition and its articulation with green economic development in and beyond the United States, but that has been surprisingly neglected in critical scholarship. In the United States, questions of the sufficiency of energy, its basic affordability and security, have receded in domestic energy politics -not the case when modern clean energy technologies were developed in the 1970s.
Instead, proponents frame renewable energy development and broader clean energy interventions 1 as a vehicle for novel forms of innovation, economic development, and political economic power -would-be qualitative transformations and secular expansions within a global capitalist economy. This narrative has built on preexisting discourses of high-tech "disruption" (Knuth 2017 ) and rejuvenated U.S. hegemony, including decades-old arguments for a "service economy" and "New Economy" to be led from innovative urban-regional economies like Silicon
Valley. As I will argue, it has simultaneously inherited, and stands to further, a longstanding "financialization" of these performative visions of U.S. innovativeness and sustained power (Krippner 2011 , Christophers 2013 ).
Theoretically and methodologically, this discussion advances new political and cultural economic scholarship on green economic development (and clean energy transition as a central project of that development), financialization, and, crucially, the deepening articulations between these contemporary processes (Georgeson et al. 2014 , Baker 2015 , Bracking 2015 , Castree and Christophers 2015 , Knuth 2016 , Kennedy 2018 , Langley 2018 (Caprotti 2012 , Mulvaney 2013 , Davies 2013 , Knuth 2017 , economic sociologists and innovation theorists (Block and Keller 2011 , Krippner 2011 , Mazzucato 2015 and science and technology (STS) scholars, particularly those working within the emerging cultural political economy of research and innovation (CPERI) (Birch 2017, Goldstein and Tyfield 2017).
A Breakthrough Energy Coalition? U.S. "Breakthrough" Debates in the 2010s
In the lead-up to the Paris COP21 climate meeting in 2015, Bill Gates and two dozen other tech and finance billionaires announced a bold investment commitment for climate change mitigation:
they would collectively dedicate billions of their private funds to the development of "breakthrough" clean energy technologies, profoundly novel innovations to transform (and "disrupt", e.g. Knuth 2017) energy production and use in the 21 st century. Gates, who spearheaded the formation of this Breakthrough Energy Coalition, took a lead role in representing its mission (e.g., Bennet 2015 , Gates 2015 , Gates and Gates 2016 , Pontin 2016 .
The Coalition demonstrated a faith in the power of the private sector and so-called angel investment long familiar from narratives of Silicon Valley's success, as both private and public actors promoted its "open" model as the heart of the U.S. innovation system. Unusually, however, the Coalition also appealed to governments' role in technology development -a role that venture capitalists, entrepreneurs and policymakers have ignored and undermined for decades, as the rise of neoliberal economic thought since the 1970s and its successful attack on the Keynesian developmental state made overt U.S. industrial policy increasingly politically intractable (even as "hidden" industrial policy in diverse forms continued and even intensified) (Peck and Tickell 2002 , Block and Keller 2011 , Mazzucato 2015 , Goldstein and Tyfield 2017 breakthrough that will save our planet and power our world (Gates and Gates 2016) .
Although many in the U.S. business press lauded the Breakthrough Energy Coalition's blend of billionaire philanthropy and enlightened investor self-interest, it has received a critical reception from a number of leading clean energy policy experts, entrepreneurs, and financiers (e.g., Dolezalek et al. 2015 , Shah 2015 , Liebreich 2016 , Romm 2016 Moreover, they caution that drawing investors' focus to R&D might divert needed funds from the more expensive proposition of large-scale deployment -a task that Bloomberg New Energy Finance estimates will require $12.1 trillion through 2040 for electric power systems alone (Zindler and Locklin 2016) . A similar argument applies to governments, who might be tempted to use "technology push" R&D supports to postpone undertaking more politically challenging "demand pull" deployment programs. The latter include feed-in tariffs promising favorably priced, secure contracts for renewable energy producers; renewable portfolio standards requiring a certain percentage of renewables in a power pool, with or without "carve-outs" mandating set amounts of particular generation sources or technologies; production and investment tax credits, depreciation allowances, and other renewable energy subsidies effected through tax codes; and a range of related subsidies, protections, and quotas -as well as the more indirect support provided by greenhouse gas emissions caps and negative pricing. and distributed rooftop systems. This total adds to BNEF's PV module prices "balance of system" costs (e.g., for inverters, batteries, and other hardware) and "soft" costs (for financing, installation labor, permitting, and a range of other infrastructure development costs). Both balance of system and soft costs are nationally and regionally specific, and both also historically have swelled the price of solar energy, as I will discuss more below. For wind, DOE (2015) reports that power purchase agreements for U.S. wind systems fell from 7 cents/kilowatt-hour Hostility to overt industrial policy and a national mandate for renewables in the United
States has meant that questions of "free" market competitiveness, and evaluative standards such as renewables' ability to achieve electric "grid price parity" with fossil fuels, have dominated national renewable energy politics and breakthrough debates. 8 Although U.S. renewable portfolio standards might require a certain percentage of all renewable energy technologies at the state level, and carve-outs go further in requiring that utilities procure a fixed amount of a particular energy resource, neither sets a price for this energy. In characteristic neoliberal fashion, these policies ostensibly leave such price-setting to the working of the market.
Meanwhile, in actual practice, more and less overt, a broad range of government programs now subsidize renewables, while fossil fuels and nuclear energy use decades of their own far-greater government subsidies and supports to stack the deck against new entrants. I will argue in the next section that even as renewables increasingly do succeed in reaching U.S. grid parity (DOE 2015) , market price remains a locus of strategy and debate. However, this new "cheapness" is a product of political economy as much as raw technological potential, no matter how thoroughly breakthrough visions attempt to "render technical" its politics (Li 2007 ).
Breakthrough Debates in Context: U.S. Renewables' Turbulent History
To contextualize today's breakthrough debate, quests for energy breakthroughs have a long history in U.S. renewables development -but a mixed record. In the early 2000s, Garud and unconventionals boom, and so forth. However, the "solar trade war" that emerged between the China, the United States, and the European Union in this period was a key driver (Caprotti 2015 , Mulvaney 2016 . From the mid-2000s on, China has worked to become a leading player in global renewable energy manufacturing, destabilizing established geographies of production and competition among the United States, Denmark, Germany, Japan, and other long-term leaders.
With strong state supports, including in some cases state ownership, Chinese companies rapidly scaled up production of both wind turbines and solar PV modules, the latter using mature crystalline silicon technology rather than the experimental designs cleantech that can compete globally (Goldstein and Tyfield 2017) . This narrative cedes ground to arguments that U.S. venture capitalists and small start-ups alone are poorly equipped to handle cleantech manufacturing's typical capital intensity and long development periods: despite its common self-presentation, venture capital wants its high profits on a far less patient timeline.
Critics had pointed out these deficiencies in the U.S. innovation system for years (e.g., Block and Classified as industrial policy or not, the U.S. government is already pursuing steps to protect domestic renewables manufacturers. Both the United States and European Union have accused China of export "dumping", using "unfair" state subsidies to allow its companies to price solar panels below the costs of production. Supporters of breakthrough solar technologies alleged that China's mass production-and-deployment strategy had nipped promising innovations in the bud (Caprotti 2015 (Caprotti , 2017 . U.S. solar companies' anti-dumping rationale was disingenuous in obvious ways, given the U.S.'s own (if less successful) subsidies. 
From Cleantech to "Fintech": Selling Breakthrough Financial Innovation
The strategies discussed above reproduce a common basic argument: that a global clean energy transition, and U.S. economic competitiveness within that transition, both require fundamental technological breaks and disruptions. We must thus ask the converse question of today's breakthrough debates: who in the United States is instead advocating deployment-first policies, and why, beyond the appeals to the common good described in the first section (what steps are required for timely climate change mitigation)?
Cleantech 2.0: Innovation in Deployment?
First, arguments advanced by Romm (2016) (gathering, communicating, tracking, measuring) and cleantech (Luce and Steel, 2015, p. 188) .
Some of Gates' critics in the 2010s advance a similar vision. They highlight IT's role in creating a "smart" and "digital" electric grid, one that can accommodate an influx of intermittent renewable energy from various U.S. regions -often far from urban load centers. Relatedly, they propose energy storage breakthroughs through innovative grid management (an alternative to batteries and other "hardware" solutions). But they also think bigger: (Dolezalek et al. 2015) .
Where we really need billions to be spent is on the scaling up of applications and businessmodel innovations that build upon currently available clean energy technologies. Like the revolution in personal computing a generation ago, we're at the dawn of the era of distributed intelligence in clean energy. Much of the hardware progress has been achieved.

Now we must make it broadly available and easy to use; we need to connect and automate it and make it as ubiquitous and intuitive as the web and the smart phone…Energy is undergoing the same kind of transition that Microsoft led in the IT realm. It is moving from a centralized system to a distributed, networked set of consumer products and services-a transition critical to making these technologies globally affordable and impactful
"Fintech": Financial Innovation for Clean Energy?
Significantly, however, programs for deployment-based innovation do not stop with IT: clean energy finance has become a central component of this broader vision of a revitalized, redirected, and low capital intensity U.S. cleantech sector, in and beyond Silicon Valley. Assessments of the state of U.S. cleantech in the 2010s increasingly emphasize the importance of "deployment finance companies" (Gaddy et al. 2016 Exemplifying the model, SolarCity's solar as a service-like brand of financial innovation has been particularly influential within U.S. cleantech. As a rooftop solar PV installer, SolarCity developed a third-party leasing/financing model that it marketed to clients: the company would install solar panels on residential roofs but retain ownership of the equipment, financing the costs of the system through selling households the energy produced on their properties. The pitch was that households could obtain energy more cheaply than they could by purchasing panels outright, and with less hassle and maintenance. SolarCity's own benefits from this arrangement were more complicated. For one thing, it and installer-financiers like it were key beneficiaries of the global cheapening of PV modules in the 2010s -politics that aligned it against U.S. manufacturers in the solar trade war with China (Caprotti 2015) .
More controversially still, SolarCity did not make its profits only from the sale of energy to clients or from the increasing cheapness of its base technology. Critically, the company set up its leasing model in a way that allowed it to appropriate the value of new renewable energy tax credits set up by the Obama Administration, ones nominally intended for households' own use.
SolarCity acquired these tax credits from households, aggregated them, and on-sold them to large third-party investors searching for a legal tax shelter. In all, as one BNEF representative argued, "I would consider SolarCity not a solar company but a financial engineering company that has expertise in solar" (cited in Woody 2012). SolarCity and companies like it label (or euphemize) this organized appropriation of federal tax incentives as "tax-equity" financing, and market it as a genuine breakthrough in renewable energy development -the kind of innovation capable of filling the multi-trillion-dollar deployment "financing gap" that Zindler and Locklin (2016) quantify above.
14 SolarCity has hardly been alone. A wave of similar green finance/fintech companies sprang up in the 2010s. Like SolarCity, they promised to help fill the renewable energy financing gap -generate creative ways of making money from clean energy infrastructure deployment, so that more private investors might be drawn to the sector -and to use distinct financial sector expertise to solve challenges in the deployment process.
Paradoxes of Green Financialization
Paradoxically, one of the central problems that these would-be financial innovations target is itself a product of financialization, defined here as the (re)growth of an increasingly large, powerful, profitable, and complex financial sector in the neoliberal era -a process that U.S.
policies have directly supported via strategic de-and re-regulations (see e.g., Langley 2008 , Krippner 2011 , Christophers 2013 for more extensive discussions). More specifically, modern U.S. renewable energy development grew up in an era in which the recession of the welfare state under neoliberal ideological assault and austerity was accompanied by rising financial sector interest in the production and management of infrastructure as a profit-generating enterprise (Torrance 2008 , Ashton et al. 2012 , O'Neill 2013 , Langley 2018 ).
These structural transformations have shaped a central role for major financial institutions and finance sector profits in U.S. renewable energy development, in ways that now threaten the sector's future growth. As noted above, the cost of base technologies like PV modules is only one factor in the price of renewable energy systems. Analysts have long noted that the price of U.S. renewables, especially rooftop solar and solar PV in general, is unusually high due to "soft" costs -particularly the costs of capital. For example, the DOE (2015) reported that in 2014, Germany's rooftop PV system costs were, at $2.13/W, about half the U.S. averagedespite the two countries' similarly priced solar hardware (PV modules and balance of systems).
As renewables' base technologies rapidly become cheaper, financing represents an increasingly high share of systems' costs to consumers (Feldman and Bolinger 2016) -and one that Gatesstyle breakthroughs in renewable energy hardware will not directly reduce. Moreover, financial players' ability to extract unusually high rents from renewable project development is not simply a matter of banks demanding higher fees for a risky new sector, as Shah's comment in the first section implies. It also has much to do with finance's growing ability to extract monopoly rents in a context of increasingly privatized infrastructure development.
Utility-scale renewable energy developments in the United States have from their inception in the late 1970s relied upon a specialized form of infrastructure financing known as project finance -indeed, analysts of project finance usually date its modern rise to that moment, 15 although in the neoliberal era the tool took off across a broad range of infrastructure types and geographies (Finnerty 2007 , Esty 2014 , Langley 2018 . In project finance's model, infrastructure developers create a legally separate company whose single purpose is to build and/or operate a large project like a solar farm or wind field. That company takes on an unusually high rate of debt, pledging to repay financial backers through revenue generated from the infrastructure itself -in selling energy and resources produced, often under a previously arranged contract like a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA); extracting user fees; and so on. However, as shell companies that pass their revenue on to third party investors, they have a negligible tax burden. Instead, they use complex ownership arrangements to pass these tax shelter benefits too on to their investors -historically a small group of very large investment banks, insurance companies, and commercial banks capable of legally and profitably "mining" these tax savings (Schwabe et al. 2009, Bolinger and Feldman 2016) . Investors may profit from tax shelter benefits far more than revenue from energy sales.
In the neoliberal era, investors have pursued lucrative tax-equity financing arrangements in both renewable energy and other areas of U.S. urban and infrastructural development: affordable housing development, using Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC); community economic development, through New Market Tax Credits; and historic preservation, via Historic Tax Credits (Hackworth 2005 , Deng 2013 ). These sectors' shared mechanisms mean that their users often compete for the same tax equity investors, and renewable energy in particular has been dominated by handful of financial players. The pool included about twenty active institutions immediately before the 2008 financial collapse. In the crisis, the number shrunk to fewer than six -investment banks were simply not making enough profits to benefit from tax 21 equity-mining (Schwabe et al. 2009 ). This monopoly position has given financiers a troubling power to extract a high price for their capital -and did so even in the midst of the financial crisis, as the collapse allowed tax-equity investors still viable to charge even higher rents for their investment. Policymakers increasingly criticize this financing model as inefficient, costly, and damaging to ongoing renewable energy deployment (over and above its reliance on federal tax credits that may now be vulnerable) (e.g., Schwabe et al. 2009, Bolinger and Feldman 2016) .
Crucially, the financial sector's ongoing power is evident in the solution many U.S.
commentators (private and public) espouse: one that arguably further financializes cleantech and renewable energy infrastructure development, in that it seeks a solution in financial expertise, financial innovation and asset creation, and new financial markets. The Obama Administration initiated one temporary "fix" in the financial crisis: loosening rules so that large corporations like
Google could get in on the tax-equity market. Subsequently, proponents have sold asset-backed securitization as the future of financing clean energy infrastructure -adapting practices used for real estate investment, including in the production of the subprime bubble, for renewable energy infrastructure. Via securitization, lenders can on-sell loans to third party lenders/consortia or, preferably, secondary markets, freeing up capital that they can sink into new loans -a churning and expansion of capital that could theoretically expand indefinitely if the business model works.
Advocates like Jigar Shah (2016) aim to turn renewable energy infrastructure into a standardized financial asset for institutional investors like pension funds to invest in. They claim that this securitization can thereby dramatically cut the costs of capital, performing a type of financialization that advocates have typically framed (for example, in the creation of modern stock exchanges) as a fundamental financial innovation, and moreover a species of democratization: turning to a broader pool of investors to lessen the power of individual rentiers.
SolarCity was once again a high-profile experimenter here. It began to issue asset-backed securities based upon its residential leases in 2013, and quickly expanded these issuances through the 2010s. However, also again it was hardly alone. Competing experiments and proposals include converting renewable projects into "YieldCos," a form of publically traded company; tying renewable energy installation to property tax bills via Property-Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) loans; adapting real estate and infrastructure instruments such as real estate investment trusts (REITs) and master limited partnerships for renewable energy infrastructure;
and developing new solar-secured loans; among others (e.g., Lowder and Mendelsohn 2013, Feldman and Bolinger 2016) . One instrument, YieldCos, already saw a major bubble in the mid2010s -which when it collapsed in 2015 eventually sent SunEdison, Jigar Shah's former company (which remained an ambitious experimenter in fintech), into bankruptcy.
Discussion and Conclusions
The U.S. cleantech debate explored here, and the broader intra-capitalist conflict that it expresses, remains live at the time of this writing. It is unlikely to be resolved soon. Adjudicating Administration attempted more open industrial policy in and beyond stimulus-era supports for cleantech startups, it was attacked at once from the right, from actors hostile to both government planning and renewables full stop, and from the left for insufficient ambition and ideological and material commitment. At the same time, it attempted to advance a much more comprehensive
Green Keynesian vision that, however partial and problematic in execution (Goldstein and Tyfield 2017) , is notably absent from the models discussed here. While both programs advance proposals for recuperating U.S. private profits and national hegemony in a clean energy transition, neither has a real plan for green jobs, for the majority of the U.S. population who do not work in tech or finance.
As such, the models discussed here sidestep a fundamental question for the United States:
whether the country can develop a green economy without a forceful break from neoliberal economic prescriptions, strategies, and hidden-at-best industrial policies -one that will be politically hard-fought, even as the 2016 Presidential election opened the door to new U.S.
protectionism from the left as well as the right, and China's green economy thrives through ignoring neoliberal screeds against industrial planning. As the visions explored here recast existing models of U.S. tech and/or financial hegemony, they continue to cede renewable energy manufacturing to China and other low-cost producers abroad -positioning most U.S. workers as consumers of clean energy technologies rather than producers of it. Breakthrough imaginaries do not promise "shovel-ready" manufacturing jobs and require a broader leap of faith -even if they do succeed in disrupting cleantech with new basic technologies, they cannot guarantee that their production will not simply follow other manufacturing abroad. When the question even comes up for deployment-first alternatives, they typically propose low-and moderate-skill jobs in infrastructure construction/installation and servicing. These jobs have indeed been on the rise amid the U.S.'s wave of renewables deployment in the 2010s. However, like infrastructure and the construction sector more generally, they are subject to significant questions of job quality and durability -unlike renewable energy manufacturing, most infrastructure work disappears once construction is complete.
What the embattled Green Keynesianism and related "green collar" jobs calls of the late 2000s did get right in theory, and the debates presented here must consider, is that these more holistic considerations of U.S. economic interest matter politically in a context of energy transition. Populist political narratives in the 2016 Presidential Election contained many halftruths and fictions around the death of U.S. coal and how to apportion blame for it (coal has declined due to multiple internal and external factors, notably the rise of domestic natural gas).
However, over the longer term rising renewable energy industries do ultimately threaten to overturn existing fossil fuel industries, working class and professional jobs, and regional production economies. They are under unusually high political pressure to produce new jobs that might replace sectors lost. As such, specters of a largely "jobless" green economy are a major obstacle to a U.S. clean energy transition, even if it that development serves the narrower and more abstracted versions of U.S. economic self-interest discussed here. Any serious industrial policy for U.S. cleantech, disruptive or in deployment, must ultimately confront this fundamental political economic challenge.
